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DECISION ANALYSIS AND STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:
A COMPARISON BETWEEN APPLICATIONS IN ELECTRONICS
AND ETHICAL PHARMACEUTICALS
Abstract
The process of strategic management of research and development is
contrasted through the application of decision analysis in the
evaluation of R&D projects—one in an electronics company, and one in a
pharmaceutical company.
Issues considered include the different character of applied R&D
in each industry resulting from, for example, the shorter product life
cycles that apply to the electronics industry compared to the much
longer life-cycles in the pharmaceutical industry. The difference of
time horizon between the two industries suggests that different deci-
sion criteria might be adopted in project evaluation. Decision-makers
in both industries express a need for flexible decision and performance
criteria in relation to strategy dialogue about alternative project-
options.
Implementation problems encountered include: long terra discounting,
the nature of the preference function for long-terra cash flow streams,
issues in making assessments of uncertainty in relation to long-term
future time horizons, and the management of research portfolios.
\^>"V '-*.

The Mature of the R&D Decision Process and Strategic Management
Industries such as electronics and ethical pharmaceuticals are
heavily dependent for their success upon the productivity of research
and development. In both fields, the. strategy for development of new
products has been undergoing significant changes over the past twenty
years. (Bemelmans (1978), Balthasar et al. (1973), Harrigan (1933))
The explosion of scientific knowledge in these areas has led to more
rational and productive approaches for carrying out research.
In the ethical pharmaceutical area, for example, less use is being
made of traditional methods for finding new drugs, which involved
screening at random chemical components to discover safe, therapeutic
products. Such methods have been largely superseded by approaches
which involve initial specification of the characteristics required in
a new drug. Use is then made of newly developed scientific information
on the molecular biology of disease and the processes of drug action to
design, in a custom-built sense, the molecular structure of the desired
compound.
In the electronics industry, rapid technological developments in
micro-electronics and micro-circuitry have shortened the life cycle of
many end-products, and have increased the risks involved in research
activity.
The common strategic reaction of many pharmaceutical companies has
been to concentrate upon a selected number of research areas
—
typically sayp> from three to six therapeutic classes. By restricting
these areas initially, the company is able to build up expertise,
strength and an identifiable market position, and then later extend
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research into closely related and integrated product areas. This trend
has been hastened by the increasing costs of research activity and the
uncertainty about eventual sales. Some new drugs are reputed to
require investments in excess of $50 m. - $75 m.
Those decision processes which might lead to a new applied research
product in the pharmaceutical and electronic areas are characterized in
this paper. Some or all of the following steps in the decision process
have to be identified. These include the generation of ideas,
screening, analysis of projects considered for selection, physical
development of the product, test marketing, production and marketing.
Special attention is focussed on the role of strategic decision analy-
sis at the project analysis and evaluation stage, as it can potentially
handle the influence of risk and uncertainty, multiple objectives, the
sequential character of research and development, as well as promote
the interactions necessary between R&D, finance, marketing and pro-
duction for effective strategic management. This role is examined in
relation to two case studies drawn from electronics and pharmaceu-
ticals, and the problems and strategic issues in implementation are
highlighted.
Case A: Policy Options in an Electronics Company
Background
Firm A has interests in the applications of microelectronics to
computers and analytical instrumentation. It has followed industry
trends by integrating backward and forwards to maintain a competitive
strength, not only in semi-conductor manufacture but increasingly also
in end products. Its strategic management emphasis is to undertake
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R & D in order to provide the strategic base for the company's long
term growth. It stresses leadership and high quality in its research
activities, and requires that R&D generates the competitive edge to
enable the firm to finance its long-terra growth as far as possible from
internally generated funds.
A range of possible R&D project areas appear frequently for eval-
uation and feasibility screening. As a conscious policy the research
and development group work closely with marketing staff and production
engineers, and thus keep abreast both of market needs and potential
production improvements, i.e., applied design projects. Idea develop-
ment is regarded as a very important process. Regular project review
and brainstorming meetings are held by the research staff who are
divided into groups by area of R&D expertise.
Once a new product idea has been generated, its potential progress
is monitored in a process involving the following steps:
1) Investigation
2) Laboratory Prototype
3) Production Prototype
4) Pilot Run
Decision Analysis
Only the investigation phase is dealt with in this paper because it
is then that decisions about the adoption of projects are made. It
comprises three relatively distinct stages. First, a preliminary pro-
duct survey , during which a broad definition of the potential technical
and end market features of the project is required. Second, a detailed
design study involving a thorough evaluation of possible project
-4-
designs. Third, a project proposal which firms up the technical and
economic framework for the project.
The following discussion concentrates on two decision analysis
models used for screening a set of R & D policy areas. As the company
was a private enterprise, the financial worth of each project needed to
be assessed from the outset. The first model uses a form of risk simu-
lation [Hertz and Thomas (1983)] to sensitize decision-makers to the
existence of risk and for financial forecasting of return, cost and
revenue factors. The second involves a multi-dimensional, multi-
attributed utility model which has as one of its attributes a financial
worth measure. Thus, the mean/variance analysis provided by the risk
simulation approach had the purpose of offering a firmer basis for
assessments on this attribute.
These models were evaluated in the context of a meeting held to
assess ten new project areas for the company. The areas were appraised
by four senior engineers from the company.
It was decided to adopt the simulation approach because distribu-
tions of IRR (internal rates of return) could easily be obtained, and
these were used in conjunction with the net present value (NPV). A
structural flow chart for the risk analysis procedure is shown in
Appendix 1. Net cash flows per period were generally assumed to be
independent although certain meaningful patterns of dependence were
present in the model structure. Probabilistic assessments for such
underlying project variables as cost and sales volume were obtained
using the fractile assessment approach (Moore and Thomas (1976)). Each
of the four decision-makers made assessments based upon differing
assumptions about project areas.
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Problems arose in measurement: in two situations. First, there were
difficulties involved in obtaining probability assessments from
appropriate decision-makers, mainly because of the large number of
assessments required, and the complexity of each project. The decision
analyst's presence was usually required by engineers to enable them to
sharpen and better understand the probability assessment process.
Second, they had some difficulty in making assessments for future
events such as sales in the later years of the project. The analyst
encouraged them to graph optimistic and pessimistic scenarios for sales
volume over time and use such scenarios as a frame of reference for
subsequent assessments.
The attributes used in the subsequent Churchman-Ackof f multiattri-
buted model (see Appendix 2) were generated in a Delphi process by the
four senior engineers. They were: profitability, growth and diversity
of the product line, offensive research mounted to anticipate com-
petition, increased market share, maintenance of technical capability,
increase in company research image (quality) and development of
research staff skills. The relative weighting for these attributes was
developed using the approach suggested by Edwards (1976).
Discussion of Results of Models in Firm A
In terms of the risk-simulation model Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 and the
associated graphs (Figures 1-4) show that where more than one decision
maker was responsible for evaluating a project, the measures of IRR,
NPV and payback differ, and often quite markedly. Figures 1 to 4 show
for each decision-maker respectively a graph of standard deviation of
his estimate against the net present value at a discount rate of 10%.
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Table 1 displays options for dealing with Che projects according to
each decision-maker's valuation—the higher the ratio the greater the
potential value of the project.
Insert Tables 1-5 and Figures L-4 about rnere
There appears to be support for screening out project 2 and taking
a niuch closer look at 4, 5, 7, 10.
The results from use of the Churchman-Ackof f model are given in
Table 6. The agreement between decision-makers is poor (Table 7). The
attempt in Table 8 to produce a consensus ranking is, in fact, a linear
additive equal weighting scheme for the set of judges. It shows that
projects 2, 7, 10 are less favored project areas whereas 8, 3, 1 and 5
are more favored.
Insert Tables 6-3 about here
Although there is some agreement among the screening procedures
about either good or bad project areas, there is a considerable grey
area in between, where factors such as other attributes not included
in the evaluation, problem assumptions, and so on, may be important.
Implementation and Further Screening of Areas
The pilot study of screening procedures in Company A highlighted
as many problems as it did solutions. Some of them are listed below:
(i) The screening process models used inevitably lead to a con-
sensus problem in reconciling the separately produced criteria from
each individual. However, it is more appropriate to use consensus
estimates of probability or value obtained through a group dialogue
process as inputs for the NPV model. This seems more valuable than
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efforts Co thrash oat a consensus view about the single most relevant
decision criterion.
(ii) The ten project areas had been screened initially by a "team"
scenario process. There was much subsequent discussion about how and
under what assumptions the derived product-market areas were obtained.
It could be argued that an entirely different, indeed diametrically
opposite, view of future scenarios (and associated product market
concepts) should have been introduced at an early stage in the dialogue
about options resulting perhaps in the generation of a wider set of
project options.
(iii) A's future depends upon strategic risk-taking and continuing
investment in R & D possibilities. Therefore, it was felt that the top
corporate management should give research management guidelines con-
cerning the company's preferred risk/return profile for the portfolio
of R & D investment possibilities. Further, it is essential that the
firm should indicate clearly its goals for R&D and that trade offs be-
tween respective rates of return and their risk exposure charac-
teristics be identified. For example, should the corporate policy
require that each project earn better than some pre-specif ied target
level or should flexibility be built into the evaluation process?
In reviewing these problems it was decided to adopt the following
changes. First, that increased initial effort in the process should be
directed towards a more focussed questioning of assumptions, scenarios,
product /market- concepts. Some extreme scenarios were to be included in
the agenda for debate and dialogue, and team members were asked to exam-
ine, challenge and take "devil's advocate" positions about project
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assumptions. Notice Chat this decision makes the inquiry system more
complex and multi-dimensional in accordance with Churchman's (1971)
conflict-based Kantian and Hegelian forms of inquiry system. That is,
several views about the problem are held and consensus is achieved
through group dialogue and debate. Second, it was decided that the
decision-making unit should be the team rather than the individual.
Emphasis was placed upon the value of achieving consensus judgments
about problem structure and about the assessments of probabilities and
values, by obtaining the widest possible "airing" of views and assump-
tions. It could also be argued that strategic assumptions analyses
(Mason and Mitroff (1981)) are probably more valuable than forced con-
sensus processes of the Delphi type in achieving some meaningful
"closure" for consensus judgments. Third, it was decided that the
multi-attributed screen could be carried out more sensibly in asso-
ciation with a sensitivity analysis of a certainty model, before the
strategic risk analysis was carried out. Strategic risk analysis need
then be focussed only on those options which pass through the dialogue
process of project structuring and multiattributed (MAUT) screening.
It was also decided that the MAUT screening process should be modified
to provide more rapid feedback about options on the lines suggested by
Humphreys and Wisudha (1979), Sarin (1977) and Slevidge (1976).
It is appropriate at this point to review the- role of the cer-
tainty model and sensitivity analysis (see Rappoport (1967)).
Basically, -tne' certainty model involves calculating NPV for a project
using single, most likely estimates for annual cash flows. Sensitivity
analysis with such a certainty model investigates the effect that a
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small change in each of the variables would have on the NPV measure.
It, therefore, identifies the variables whose uncertainty would have
the largest effect on the NPV. It is further argued that the advan-
tages of the certainty model, with sensitivity analysis back-up, lie in
relation to the simplicity, speed and economy of the process. The pro-
cess can quickly highlight projects or research areas with high risk or
loss potential and, thus, allow managerial effort to be focussed upon
those research areas which promise well for the organization's future.
Such an emphasis would make more sense of both the subsequent applica-
tion of multi-attribute screening approaches, and a detailed strategic
risk analysis.
When this process was implemented, a further MAUT analysis was
carried out on an augmented project set. This resulted in two further
options being added to the project set 8, 3, 1 and 5 already considered
as candidates for the strategic risk analysis. The output from this
risk analysis was then discussed in great detail, at both the corporate
level and at the R&D team level. The consensus view was that all of
areas should be examined further, both in terms of their projected fit
within the portfolio of activities, and also in relation to
"dovetailing" corporate goals and objectives (such as the risk/reward
trade-off) with the "projected" results of the portfolio.
This dialogue process simply recognizes that there is no single
"best" criterion, • or set of criteria, by which strategic management of
the firm's j£r-4^D--and growth process should be handled. Some managers
still argued that the ability to keep abreast of the long-term tech-
nological futures was more important than such purely short-term
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financial issues as risks, returns and timing of cash flows. Their
concern was with the common top management focus upon short-term finan-
cial results. However, there was agreement that some "'balance" between
high risk, high return and low risk, low return activities was worth-
while, provided that the organization's financial objectives had a
medium to long term focus. Corporate management then reviewed the pro-
ject set and decided to go for all of the finally screened areas. The
decision was based on the view that they offered both the potential for
longer-term skills strategic development and also the attainment of
satisfactory short to medium term financial results.
Case 3: Project Evaluation of Ethical Pharmaceuticals Company
Firm B is a research oriented pharmaceutical company specializing
in ethical pharmaceuticals (prescription drugs) rather than "over-the-
counter" proprietary products. It competes in that segment of the
industry in which the main competitive requirement is heavy spending on
R&D activity, directed specifically towards the development of new
ethical drugs or compounds. This is in contrast to the so-called
"generic" segment (non-branded), in which R&D efforts are largely
directed towards improving manufacturing efficiency (i.e., competition
on the basis of low-cost manufacture).
Approximately 10% of Firm B's sales volume is invested in R & D and
a key performance measure in that area is the ability to produce a
regular flow of ethical pharmaceuticals which can be successfully
marketed. However, firms such as 3 have to accept that only 10-20% of
new compounds ever achieve significant technical success, quite apart
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from ultimate commercial success. That is, the risks and costs of con-
tinued research activity are high. Therefore, strategic management of
the research portfolio should ensure a sound cash flow balance between
new and existing products. Existing products should be positioned to
generate positive net cash flows in order to provide a strong basis for
internal funding of those in the developmental stage and those new R &
D activities directed towards medium to long term growth.
Lengthy time horizons are common in pharmaceutical R&D. It may
take from ten to twelve years to develop a drug from initial for-
mulation to the point of sale —that is, around ten years after a patent
on a new product or process is granted. Since patent life is seventeen
years (in the United States) - the firm typically has protection against
significant competition in the three to six years of initial "growth"
sales in the product's life cycle. Thus, companies may be able to
establish a leadership base for continued medium to long-term cash flow
generation. The product life of a drug in the "market-place may nor-
mally be from fifteen to twenty years. This may be extended if the
product's uniqueness in quality and branding can be maintained.
In the pharmaceutical R&D process, the stages through to registra-
tion can be characterized as follows. The initial phase of screening
involves the search for potentially useful compounds in the firm's
areas of therapeutic concentration. This stage can take upwards of one
year, and depends upon the form of exploration and synthesis required
Cross-licensing and joint-venture arrangements may reduce the
developmental time period.
2
This patent period may be lengthened by pending legislation in the
U.S. Congress and House of Representatives.
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to generate a potential project candidate. For example, there is a
strong contrast between random screening processes and those based on
molecular biology.
The next two stages involve the development of the product to the
pre-clinical decision point . This development phase involves pharam-
cological and toxicological studies of the new compound to determine
the extent of chemical viability in the designated therapeutic class.
At the preclinical decision point, the issue is whether to test the
drug compound in animals in order to determine safety and therapeutic
efficiency. If the preclinical stage is successfully completed, then
clinical trials are undertaken on a limited basis with human subjects.
During the course of these clinical studies the firm also carries out
further long-term toxicological trials, and examines suitable production
process development.
Success at the clinical stage allows the company to apply for drug
registration by national country drug authorities. Some countries are
considerably more stringent than others, and often require extremely
detailed technical, therapeutic and clinical research information.
Registration, once achieved, allows the firm to market the drug to doc-
tors and health authorities.
Two features about this development and product life cycle process
should be noted prior to a discussion of the case study. First, that
the probability of technical success is low—typically in the range 0.1
to 0.2 as a„.h±8torical relative frequency. Second, that technical suc-
cess does not necessarily guarantee commercial success. Evidence
available suggests that the probability of commercial success is around
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50%, implying that only 5-10% of compounds overall can be commercially
successful.
The Contrapil Case Studv
Introduction
The case deals only with the application of decision analysis to
the process of evaluating a single project within a given research
therapy area in Firm B. However, it was part of a pilot incrementation
of the use of decision analysis in the strategic management of the
research and development process as a whole in which both individual
projects and research area portfolios were appraised.
This case study illustrates the use of licensing, a joint-venture
strategy, as one of the many strategies that larger pharmaceutical com-
panies use in order to shorten the length of the development time hori-
zon of an individual research project. Pharmaceutical companies employ
experts to identify valuable compounds developed by smaller companies,
with a view to licensing the compounds for end-use. The advantage of
the joint-venture arrangement to the smaller company is that it can
transfer the responsibility for the potentially costly pre-clinical,
clinical and registration stages to the larger company.
Contrapil should be viewed as an example of the application of
decision analysis to the evaluation of the individual research project
in the clinical pharmaceutical area.
Background .-«•%» ...
The following case study describes the proliferation of problems
which confronted a pharmaceutical company when it was offered the
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opportunity of purchasing a license to develop a specified substance,
which, for the purpose of this analysis, is known by the name "Contrapil,
The preliminary negotiations commenced in March 1969 with Benco Ltd
wishing to sell the license and Sappho Ltd as the potential purchaser.
The drug itself belonged to that group generally known as oestrogens, a
group in which the amount of work undertaken by the prospective buyer
was usually minimal. At the time of the potential sale all of the
pharmacological stages of development had been undertaken by the Benco
research laboratories.
Initial discussions were between Benco and Sappho's Licensing
Departments with Benco stipulating that they should receive approx-
imately $70-$l00 per kilogramme of the substance sold by Sappho. The
Licensing Department had to calculate the economic worth of the
substance and of advise the company as to whether or not it should
purchase the license. It was felt that the decision-making process
would benefit from the combined expertise offered by different
Departments within the company. Top management formed a general review
team which comprised members from the Licensing Department, general
research experts, hormone specialists, and a decision analyst.
At this initial stage, the team were faced with two obvious ques-
tions. Firstly, what was the likelihood of the successful completion
of toxicological and teratological trials within a short-term period
of two to three years? Secondly, what was the probability of the
completion eff" clinical trials within a further two year period, thereby
creating a possible launch target of 1974-5?
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As already stated, membership of the Review Team was broadly based
in order to produce a spread of expertise, but the resulting dispersion
of knowledge brought about a lack of consensus in certain areas under
consideration. For example, at the time of these preliminary
discussions, the amount of previous research work which would be of
assistance to the team in their evaluation of the potential success of
future toxicological trials was small. However, such work as had
already been done was sufficient to allow estimates of some of the key
parameters to be made. The research director was sure that there was a
strong relationship between use of the drug and the development of
breast tumors in certain circumstances. He concluded that there was a
75% chance of the drug failing the toxicological testing stage. If
this happened, he estimated that at least another two years of inten-
sive drug modification and re-testing would be essential before success
could be expected. The initial launch date would then be delayed until
1977-8 at the earliest. In contrast the hormone specialists were con-
vinced that the likelihood of the drug failing the toxicological stage
would be as low as 20%.
Decision Analvsis
Both sets of experts remained adamant about their subjective assess-
ments. However, compromise was eventually reached when it was agreed
to submit the question to analysis by the decision analyst. The analyst
subsequently suggested that it would be helpful to follow through the
consequences of both of the rival assessments. The decision trees
(Figures 5, 6, 7) which he eventually produced are based on the
following estimates.
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Insert Figures 5, 6, ana 7 about here
The current estimate for the total costs of toxicological and
teratological trials on the substance had been assessed as: low
$1,000,000; high $2,500,000; and most likely $1,500,000. Should
toxicological failure occur, however, it was predicted that there would
be a massive escalation of total toxicological • testing leading to a new
range of costs:- low $4,000,000; high $9,000,000; with a most likely
value of $6,000,000. Such trials would be essential should there be
the slightest suspicion that any relationship existed between use of
the drug and carcinogenic effect.
It was anticipated that the likely costs incurred at the clinical
stage would be in the range of low $1,000,000; high $1,300,000 and most
likely value of $1,100,000. In comparison to the earlier disagreement,
there was general unanimity that the probability of the likely success
of the clinical trials could be as low as 0.6; high 0.75 and most
likely value of 0.7. If these additional trials indicated the
necessity to embark on further toxicological trials then such work
would be a required supplement to the clinical trials, with a simul-
taneous increase in expenditure. Identifying the outcomes of these
supplementary trials in terms of estimated probability of success, it
was agreed that the likely range would extend from a low of 0.5 to a
high of 0.7, with a most likely value of 0.6. Inclusive of the added
costs incurred by the additional clinical trials, then the distribution
for the total clinical trials' expenditure was predicted as ranging
from: low $4,500,000; high $7,500,000; with a most likely value of
$6,000,000.
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It was thought prudent next to Look at the developmental costs in
terms of such expenditure being a proportion of the cost of a daily
dose of 75 nigs . This calculation was considered a crucial part of any
attempt to determine the profit contribution per daily dosage. For a
daily dose of 75 tngs , it was estimated that the development costs
ranged from a low of $0.04 per dose to a high of SO. 075, with a most
likely value of $0.06. If further toxicological trials were needed,
such values could be expected to rise by approximately 20%. The
materials cost of the substance was given as $0.0075 per 75 mgs and the
production cost (exclusive of research and development) was assessed as
being $0.05 per 75 mgs. It was predicted that the marketed drug could
sell at a price in the range of low 50.15 per 75 mgs, to a high of
$0.30 per 75 mgs, with a most likely value of $0.25.
Tables 10 and 11 respectively show the estimated sales forecasts
for the drug, given the following assumptions. First, a sales horizon
of ten years; second, developmental phases of either five or seven
years, the latter to include the extra toxicological trials that might
be necessary.
Insert tables 10 and 11 about here
Decision trees (Figures 5, 6, 7) were constructed from these esti-
mates of costs and revenues. The conclusion was reached that unless
the probability of success at the first decision point was greater than
0.4 the project would produce a negative net present value to the cora-
pany. That is, if the research director's estimate of 0.25 were
correct, then the product class would have to be modified. Attention
was then focussed upon the problems inherent in the procedures of
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registration and launch. Experience indicated that the process of
registration was by no means standardized across countries; for example
registration was easier to obtain in some countries than it was in
others. In the United States of .America, Japan and the United Kingdom,
stringent Governmental controls regarding the approval of drugs made
these markets relatively less attractive in th'e early stages of launch.
The strong tendency towards the centralized buying of drugs in Sweden
also made that country an unattractive •market . Indeed, in all the
above examples, it was expected that registration would be extremely
difficult without more evidence of further toxicological and clinical
testing.
Given such limitations, and in view of the desire to set a prospec-
tive launch date of 1974-5 to 1975-6, it was decided to assess the
advantages and disadvantages of potential alternative markets. It was
agreed that the initial launch should be in a market which would prob-
ably offer ready acceptance for registration. The introductory launch
would be limited in size. However, if the sales figures were
favorable and the drug could be seen as a potentially commercially suc-
cessful product, then the launch would be extended to other countries.
Given the constraints outlined above, it was anticipated that penetra-
tion into certain markets, for example the United States of America,
would be highly unlikely until 1980 at the very earliest. Unfortun-
ately, as the patent from Benco had an expiry date of 1985, any such
late launch wbuld bring with it incumbent problems for Sappho.
The group discussion was then summarized. It was agreed to ask
the commercial and licensing directors firstly, to assess the
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situation in terms of the potential risks; secondly to choose between
the alternative strategies facing Sappho, and finally, to determine the
economic worth of the license. (Notes on the details of Figures 5, 6
and 7 are given in Appendix 3.)
Discussion of Case B
The issues raised in the course of this pilot exercise are sum-
marized below:
Bi? Decision Trees
Though engineers and researchers were used to network planning for
the control of R & D activity, they nevertheless felt that there was a
danger that the decision trees for project evaluation could quickly
become very complex and "bushy." They expressed the view that the
problem should be structured in sufficient detail so that the project
was clearly identified and understood by all research staff. However,
it was felt the tree should be as simple as possible, in order to func-
tion as a means of comparing the research project analyzed with alter-
native options.
Time Problem
The research managers felt that decision analysis could sometimes
be an unduly time consuming process. Even with a "pruned" problem
structure, they felt that the processes of financial modelling and
assessment of uncertain quantities would absorb large amounts of
research managers' time. The caveat to this observation was the belief
that there were potentially plenty of opportunities to simplify the
strategic decision analysis. In particular, since many research areas
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require shared research investment and experience, decision analytic
modelling of research area portfolios is often more appropriate and
effective. That is, creative strategic management of R&D involves
aggregating projects into therapeutic research areas .and then, examining
portfolios of R & D activity derived from the research areas in terms
of strategic decision analysis. Therefore, at the corporate level, R&D
policy formulation requires the choice of resarch areas recognizing the
interdependencies such as shared experience and resources between cer-
tain research areas.
Assessment and Estimation Problems
Probabilitv Assessments
Problems were encountered in assessing probabilities of development
success and commercial success.
.
In addition, the company found great
difficulty in assessing cost distributions for clinical trials and
sales distributions for the end-product.
Estimation of Inflation Rates
A matter for concern which was not resolved was how to allow for
inflation in the estimates of project costs and sales volumes, which is
imperative because of the long-terra nature of the process of developing
ethical pharmaceuticals. (See also Wilson (1981))
Portfolio Problems
Many issues were raised both about the therapeutic area portfolios
and the overall research portfolios. In the case of the former,
questions were raised about how to set priorities to projects within
areas, and about the factors which should govern the assessment of
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resource requirements (e.g., technical capabilities, skills, financial
resources) to each. Questions about the overall research portfolios
revolved around the appropriate allocation of resources amongst
research areas so that portfolio balance might be achieved. That is,
how to obtain a sound mix between new and existing projects and satis-
factory cash flow generation to provide base funding for those pro-
jects. Further, there should be a balance between time preference and
risk preference goals. Thus, some short-term low risk projects are
needed to generate sufficient cash to sustain the promise of the high
risk, high cost, high potential projects.
Need for Flexible Criteria
The need for flexible criteria for performance evaluation of port-
folios and projects was stressed. It was argued that projects should
be examined in terms of a wide range of measures that recognize the
long-term nature of the R&D process rather than in terms of a single
-measure such as NPV. For example, managers found great difficulty in
using risk-adjusted rates of return for long-term discounting because
they gave much greater weight to costs than revenues and often produced
negative NPV's. They argued that the use of probabilistic and scenario
projections of such variables as sales projections, cost projections,
cash flow profiles would enable them to better understand the nature of
projects and portfolios.
Modif ications^to- the Initial Decision Analysis
Model
In reviewing the use of decision analysis, the research management
and director of pharmaceutical planning at Firm B decided that some
?9_
changes were required. First, it was agreed that significant mana-
gerial effort should be spent in identifying strategic research areas
(or therapeutic classes) in which the company should concentrate its R
& D activity. Senior research managers and engineers would discuss the
costs and benefits of potential research areas, and, as a bv-product
project engineers would be asked to suggest a range of specific within-
area projects for investigation and evaluation. It was felt that more
attention should be focussed on the rationale and assumptions
underlying participation in given research areas since this would be
extremely valuable for communication amongst the research staff.
Second, it was felt that potential oortfolios of strategic research
areas and projects within them should not be evaluated in terms of a
single criterion, particularly N'PV. They argued for the use of risk
analysis [see Hertz and Thomas (1983)] in deriving a number of perfor-
mance measures for planning such as cash flow profiles, sales profiles,
and capacity profiles to monitor the flow of projects in relation to
the potential of the R&D and production processes for drugs. They
felt that such profiles would enable managers to better understand the
impact of uncertainty and also avoid concentration on simplistic
discounting criteria.
Third, it was felt that sensitivity analysis and sensible forms of
multi-attributed screening could definitely help the managerial group
to define and identify areas of concentration for research activity.
These modifications were incorporated into the subsequent portfolio
evaluation and review process. Managers found them useful. They
appreciated the ability to view the problem and the output in a number
-23-
of different ways. An additional feature was incorporated into the
analysis; review points for R&D decision-making were made to
correspond with the control points in the PERT network planning dia-
grams. This drew favorable comment because it was seen that strategic
management involved not only initial evaluation but also re-evaluation,
performance control and project implementation. This recognition of an
ongoing, flexible decision process which" had the abiLity to adapt to
m
change was probably the most significant factor to emerge from the
management group in the firm.
General' Issues and Conclusions from the Two Cases
Although the nature of research and development is different in the
two cases, certain common findings emerge from the attempts to apply
decision analysis procedures. These will be summarized under the
headings of assessment problems , discounting processes , the need for
flexible decision criteria
,
and the process of policy dialogue .
Assessment problems were undoubtedly more complex in the pharma-
ceutical situation. In both cases, however, assessors had diffi-
culty in confronting future events. A simple assessment aid which
proved to be very useful involved drawing on graph paper the scenario
of future values for the uncertain variable, say sales, over the
project's time horizon. Assessors were asked to draw only best and
worst scenarios in order to avoid the potential problem of "anchoring"
around most likely or "average" values. In pilot studies it was found
that assessors exhibited "too tight" distributions if they were asked
to provide "most likely" scenario as well as optimistic and pessimistic
-24-
scenarios. This phenomenon of tightness is consistent with the studies
of Alpert and Raiffa (1969) and the "anchoring" and "adjustment" cogni-
tive heuristics postulated by Tversky and Kahnenan (1974).
Discounting processes must be applied cautiously to R & D projects.
In particular, if applied routinely to very long-term R & D projects as
in ethical pharmaceuticals, few individual projects may be justified
using ROI or NPV criteria.
Further, there may be problems in introducing risk, adjustment into
the discounting process. By using a fixed risk-adjusted rate over a
long-term horizon, the assumption is that there is some fixed,
"average" risk for which allowance has to be made. Yet a project may
be subject to different degrees of risk, at different periods during a
project's life. A more appropriate approach is to put considerable
effort into assessing cost and benefit risk, profiles over the project's
life. For example, if there is a risk in the pharmaceutical industry
that price rises may be constrained because of government regulation,
then revenue projections should reflect this. Similarly, cost projec-
tions must allow for contingencies such as technological cost savings
being eroded by labor cost rises resulting from union bargaining. It
is recommended, therefore, that risk analysis be used to generate pro-
files of cost, revenues, cash flows and capacities. This form of anal-
ysis would encourage the development of an awareness about the
influence of risk and uncertainty on the project (and indeed portfolio
for aggregatians--.of projects). Further if NPV distributions are derived,
then a risk-free discount rate (e.g., the return on a government bond
of equivalent maturity) should be used in the calculations.
-25-
It should also be noted Chat "balancing" risk preference and time
preference considerations becomes important in R & D portfolio manage-
ment. What should be the mix between long and short-term projects, and
those with high and low technical risks? In essence, which projects
generate cash and which consume cash? In these firms it was found chat
research managers appreciated being presented with cash flow profiles
of possible porcfolios. They found that these gave them a r.eans of
understanding cash flow impacts ort their porcfolios, and alerted them
to situations of potential risk.
In both contexts, parcly because of cechnological uncertainties,
there was a perceived need for flexible decision criteria . Corporate
managers wanted multiple performance measures for projects and port-
folios. Examples given were cost profiles, sales profiles, nee cash
flow profiles, produccion and R & D capacity profiles and profitability
(e.g.) NPV profiles (for a further example in another context see
•Thomas (1982)). They preferred being presented with this set of
measures than being asked to estimate corporate utility functions over
a lengthy time horizon. In essence, they baulked at utility function
assessments, and preferred being presented with profiles of relevant
performance indicator variables estimated up to the planning horizons
identified in each firm. Another reason often given was the need
to adapt quickly to strategic changes resulting not only from tech-
nology, but also from the impacts of competitive pressures.
The woc-d- foolicy dialogue has been used several times in the paper
to express the choice process concerning projects and portfolios. Both
-26-
firms felt that the process of strategic management of R&D was criti-
cal to the growth of the firm; it was complex, dynamic and charac-
terized by lengthy time-horizons. The decision analytic role in this
process turned out to be different from that often identified in very
simple applications of its comprehensively rational framework. Rather
than determining the "best" strategy, it was seen that the role of
decision analysis was to provide output (e.g., decision tree analysis,
risk, analysis, multi-attributed screens) which enabled managers to
develop a better understanding of the R & D system and engage in dialo-
gue about the dynamic character of the system being studied. Indeed,
it is argued that choice emerges from adaptive consideration of alter-
native policies presented in terms of a time-stream of indicator
variables, rather than in terms of a single criterion such as expected
utility.
The view held in this paper is that the policy dialogue framework
proved to be extremely useful in both firms for handling conflicting
viewpoints. In both cases, the character of the problem formulation
process in R&D adapted to changing views of the problem. The initial
decision analysis framework changed to a more complex policy dialogue
form involving the resolution of debate and dialogue about alternative
viewpoints and "passes" of the analytic framework. The strategy
adopted in both cases resulted from continued review, updating and con-
sensus through group discussion.
_-> 7 —
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APPENDIX 1
C\SE STUDY A: THE ELECTRONICS COMPANY
Stage I
Assess subjective probability distributions for the
following factors
i
a) Quantity sold per period
b) Price per period
c) Development costs
d) Length of project life
e) Production costs
f) Sales costs
Stage 2
Stage 3
Stage 4
Stage 5
Stage 6
V
Fit the app ropri ate statistical distribution to each
factor and generate a value from each distrib u t ion
randoml v on each Ltisrat ion of Ch e simulation
For each iteration of the simulation calculate the
net cash flows per period and the value of NPV, IRR
and payback
V
Repeat the process of simulation for a large number
of iterations and calculate the NPV, IRR and payback,
in each case
>/
Generate the simulated distribution of NPV, IRR and
payback. Find the mean and variance of each and
plot the distributions directly from the computer.
n/
Output 1) Mean and standard deviation of NPV, IRR and
payback.
2) Probability density and cumulative distri-
bution functions of NPV, IRR and payback.
Readers are referred to D. B. Hertz, "Risk Analysis
in Capital Investment," 1964, Harvard Business Review
for a further discussion of this program, or D. B.
Hertz and H. Thomas (op. cit.).
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APPENDIX 2
Churchman-Ackof f -.110(161 for multi-dimensional objectives
The following is a concise description of the Churchman-Ackof
f
model for evaluating a set of projects on a basis of multiple objec-
tives .
1. Suppose that at some moment in time, the decision-maker assigns a
relevant set of objectives (0 ...., ) for his decision problem.
1 n
2. Suppose also that he has a number of alternative research projects
(R . . . .
,
R, ) which need to be evaluated.
1 K.
3. The decision-maker then constructs a (k x n) matrix with alternative
projects as rows and objectives as columns.
...
1 n
Weights W\
R
i
4. The cells in the matrix are assigned values between and 1 accord-
ing to the extent to which each R. satisfies each of the objectives
.
_..v-
Appendix 2 (continued)
5. The decision maker is also asked to estimate a positive weight W.
to each objective subject to the restriction that
n
Z W. = 1
1-1
X
in order to establish the priority between objectives. Let W be
the (n x 1) column vector of weights.
6. A weighted objective score is then calculated for each project R.
by obtaining the (k x 1) row vector S by matrix multiplication, i.e.,
S = M x W
(k x 1) = (k x n) (n x 1)
This weighted projective score is the criterion by which preliminary
project decisions should be made.
Readers are referred to C. W. Churchman, "Introduction to Operations
Research," 1951, Wiley for fuller details of this multi-dimensional
model.
TABLE 1 - PROJECT RATING
(based on benefit/cost ratio, i.e., ratio of net present value to
standard deviation at discount rate of 10%)
DECISION-MAKER
Project 1 2 3 * L
1 /
2 X X X
3 • /
4 ? /
5 X /
6 / /
7 / ?
8 /
9 /
10 / ?
Note: [/ - OK, X - Stop, ? - Further Discussion]
V>,v
TABLE 2
ESTIMATES MADE SY DECISION-ff-AKER 1
INTERNAL RATE PAYBACK NPV AT 10% MPV AT 25 V
PROJECT OF RETURN (IRR) YEARS (3) ($)
[MEAN (S.D.)] [MEAN (S.D.)] [MEAN (S.O.)] [MEAN]
1 126.40 2.53 224750 11453b
(3.95) (0.04) (7745)
139.0 1-.68 285,500 172650
(13.1) (0.1) (21560)
242.3 2.25 847170 451070
(8.5) (0.02) (27415)
61.1 3.40 30025 12410
(3.4) (0.1) (1575)
85.5 2.72 145650 72645
(3.5) (0.1) (7500)
500 1.07 375,725 265,650
(25) (0.01) (23,500)
10 516.5 1.21 285,730 215,250
(31.5) (0.02) (12,250)
NOTE
1. The means and standard deviations in this column were obtained
using a risk-free rate (pre-tax) of 10% in the denominator and dis-
tributions for net cash flow in the numerator.
2. Obtained using expected net cash flows in the numerator and a risk-
adjusted rate (pre-tax) of 25% in the denominator.
- ~ %» .
.
(These notes apply for all subsequent tables.)
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TABLE 3
ESTIMATES MADE 3Y DECISION-MAKER 2
ROJECT [ME
IRR (%)
:an (s.d. )•]
PAYBACK
(YEARS)
[MEAN (S.D. )]
NPV at 10%
($)
[MEAN (S.D. )]
NPV at 25-',
(S)
[MEAN
]
2 72.6
(13.6)
2.3
(0.15)
111,230
(15,750)
52630
3 233.8
(6.7)
2.3
(0.02)
782200
(27120)
416870
4 178.5
(8.1)
2.4
(0.03)
129690
(4130)
67370
5 92.4
(3.3)
2.7
(0.1)
227220
(8800)
110970
NOTE: See note to Table 2.
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TABLE 4
ESTIMATES MADE BY DECISION-MAKER 3
PROJECT [ME
IRR (%)
AN (S.D.)]
PAYBACK
(YEARS
)
[MEAN' (S.D. )]
NPV at 10?:
($)
[MEAN (S.D. )]
NPV at 25%
($)
[MEAN]
6 55.7
(10.9)
3.0
(0.25)
485735
(99760)
281390
7 40.0
(10.0)
2.8
(0.3)
42250
(15600)
23250
9 51.0
(15.0)
3.2
(0.6)
126,250
(21,000)
81100
NOTE: See note to Table 1.
TABLE 5
ESTIMATES MADE BY DECISION-MAKER 4
PROJECT [ME
IRR ($)
AN (S.D. )]
PAYBACK
(YEARS)
[MEAN (S.D. )]
NPV at 10%
($)
[MEAN (S.D.)]
NPV at 25%
($)
[MEAN]
2 10.4
(5.7)
3.25
(0.6)
3050
(12420)
-13,370
6 105.5
(6.5)
2.58
(0.08)
951,324
(30,535)
515250
7 28.3
(5.4)
3
(0.2)
18120
(9520)
3130
10 44.3
(13.7)
2.5
(0.2)
40160
(10300)
22150
NOTE: See note to Table 1.
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TABLE 6
PROJECT SCORES OVER SEVEN OBJECTIVES
(According to Churchman-Ackoff Model)
DECISION-MAKER
2 3
Project Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank
1 23.34 5 = 42.59 n 30.40 5 39.68
2 23.51 7 31.03 7 35.15 3 19.93 8
3 38.91 2 35.34 4 37.31 2 41.35 3
4 18.35 3 32.14 6 — 57.54 1
5 28.34 5 = 39.64 3 — 39.68 4 =
6 31.20 4 28.88 8 31.52 4 38.28 6
7 — 12.29 10 40.11 1 16.26 9
8 44.57 1 44.25 1 — 53 . 60 1
9 — 34.97 5 23.09 6 —
10 35.95 3 23.51 9 — 24 . 92 7
NOTE: Scores expressed as percentages
TA3LE 7
BEWEE?
P
DF^rnf" CORR£LATI0N COEFFICIENTSTJE ., ECISION-' LAKER PROJECT RANKINGS IN TABLE
Decision- 1
Maker
1 1
2 0.4
3
-0.24
4 n.Ai
DECISION MAKER
2
-i
1
-0.37
0.63
1
-0.42
NOT.. The entries in the tables are the correlations between r
InT't "^^
° f diffSrent decisionmakers T^e"indicates a positive or negative relationship.
he
9 =

Motes on the Decision Trees in Figure-; 5, 6 and
1. Note that costs have been deducted at the appropriate nodes on the
tree, and not gathered up into terminal values. This is because
of the way in which the tree has been split up into symmetrical
branches
.
2. Outcomes as High, Medium or Low chances have been assigned the
probabilities 0.1, 0.8, 0.1.
3. In the clinical trials (Nodes 4-6-7 £ 5-11-12), it has been assumed
that expenditure will continue up to 7.5 M or success, whichever is
achieved first. Hence, the probability of failure is 0.3; that of
success before 4.5 M expended, 0.5; etc.
4. Profitability is mainly a function of selling price. Moreover, for
simplicity, it has been assumed that those circumstances which were
deemed to favor a High Sales Revenue were also considered to be
associated with a high selling price. Hence the single branches
emanating from nodes 8,9,10,13,14,15.
Profitability = Price - Costs (development, production & raw material)
= Price/dose - 0.12
Hence for High Sales:
Profit/Price = 18/30 = 0.6
for Medium Sales:
Profit/Price = 13/25 = 0.5
far^Low Sales:
Profit/Price = 3/15 = 0.2
Notes on the Decision Trees in Figures 5, 6 and
'
5. Discounting the future sales @ 18% to present values at 1974
Case 1 High = 63.3
Medium = 52.8
Low = 42.2
Case 2 High = 24.6
Medium = 13.6
Low = 10.4
Note: Account has been taken in Case 2 of the tact that the revenues
are delayed by 2 years.
\-^V
TABLE 10
SALES FORECAST
Case I
Development time of five years
SALES ($ MILLION)
Low Most likely Hi ;h
Year16 7 9
Year 2 9 10 12
Year 3 11 14 17
Year 4 16 13 21
Year 5 19 20 25
Year 6 14 15 17
Year 7 10 11 12
Year 8 4 7 8
Year 9 2 5 6
Year 10 1 5 6
.,%.- ..
TABLE 11
SALES FORECAST
Case 2
Development time of seven years
SALES (^MILLION)
Low Most likelv High
Year 1 1.0 2 3
Year 2 3.0 4 6
Year 3 4.0 5 9
Year 4 5.0 6 11
Year 5 7.0 8 15
Year 6 4.0 5 10
Year 7 3.0 4 8
Year 8 2.0 3 6
Year 9 -1.0 2 5
Year 10 0.5 1 3
\jrrV --:
APPENDIX 3
DECISION ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRAPIL CASE
1) The decision analysis was decomposed into a number of decision
trees as shown in Figures 5, 6 and 7.
2) The following outline the assumptions made in the analysis.
3) The "first-pass" conclusion of the analysis is that, for a positive
expected NPV at the initial decision point, p, the probability of suc-
cess must be greater than 0.4.
This follows from the equality (node L).
10.7 p - (1 - p) x 6.9
6.9
P 17.
D
= 0.4.
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